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ARTICLE 
Extraterritoriality, Externalities, and Cross-
Border Trade: Some Lessons from the United 
States, the European Union, and the World 
Trade Organization 
MAX S. JANSSON 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Heating and cooling, producing fuel, and generating 
electricity can be done with different methods and from a variety 
of resources. The choice of process and production method (PPM) 
will, however, be crucial for the environmental impact of the 
activity. Although each method in the field of energy will have 
some negative impacts, there is a general consensus in the United 
States and the European Union (EU) that current use of fossil 
fuels with their high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is 
unsustainable. Hence, a transition in the energy sector is taking 
place. On both sides of the Atlantic, initiatives have been taken 
both on union/federal-level and on state-level to promote 
renewable energy. Notable measures include tax incentives, 
subsidies, feed-in-tariffs (FITs),1 and renewable portfolio 
standards (RPSs).2  When it comes to biofuels, only sustainable 
 
 Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The research was conducted 
within the framework of project eCoherence, financed by the Academy of 
Finland. 
 1. A feed-in-tariff is a tariff that is above the market price for energy and is 
guaranteed to be paid to producers of energy from renewable energy sources 
over a given period of time. Today in Energy: Feed-in Tariff, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471 
[https://perma.cc/ULR4-ZNE6]. 
 2. Renewable portfolio standards require that actors such as producers or 
distributors provide a certain share/quota of their energy from renewables. 
1
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alternatives, as defined by specific sustainability criteria, will be 
eligible for support.3 
Measures within the diverse range of emerging strategies to 
tackle climate change and promote the transition of the energy 
sector represent new forms of intervention in the market and may 
conflict the traditional conception and values of free trade. These 
values of free trade have been incorporated in the U.S. Dormant 
Commerce Clause,4 EU free movement rules,5 and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements such as the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6 and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT)7.  As a rule, measures are prima facie 
prohibited in case of discriminatory effects but may be justified on 
for example grounds of environmental protection.8  The concept of 
discrimination in this article refers to both de jure and de facto 
discrimination as understood in the context of EU and WTO law. 
It is broader than the concept of discrimination under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause as it covers most, if not all, cases of 
undue burden on interstate trade. A measure is generally 
discriminatory if it explicitly differentiates on the basis of 
geography or if it, as a whole, has the effect of burdening out-of-
state interests more than in-state interests.9 
 
Today in Energy: Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm? 
id=4850 [https://perma.cc/YX7B-7E6H]. 
 3. Assemb. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1405 (2015); 
Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and 
Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 
art. 17, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16, 36–38; see also Max. S. Jansson & Harri Kalimo, 
On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. Approaches to 
Regulating Biofuels, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL.& PUB. HEALTH L., 104, 109 (2014). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, for the constitutional origins of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 
 5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 34–36, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 61 [hereinafter TFEU] (outlining the 
fundamental principles on free movement of goods). 
 6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
 7. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.1–2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121. 
 8. See infra Part IV(A). 
 9. See infra Part III. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3
JANSSON - FINAL 5/4/2016  6:43 PM 
2016] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & TRADE 439 
Many cases have been initiated that evolve around the trade 
law compatibility of state measures that explicitly differentiate 
between in-state and out-of-state products under the U.S. 
Constitution,10 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)11 and WTO law.12  In addition, there have been 
claims of more indirect discrimination arising from the energy 
transition. In the United States, conventional industries in states 
rich with fossil fuels have filed lawsuits with the aim to question 
the compatibility of the energy transition with applicable free 
trade regime. For example, both a state-level RPS13 and a coal 
moratorium,14 as well as biofuels sustainability programs,15 have 
been targeted. Recently, it has even been argued that fossil fuel 
 
 10. See, e.g., Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777-CJB, 2014 WL 1509780, at  *5 
(D. Del. Apr. 17, 2014) (in-state requirement repealed, case dropped); Complaint 
at 1, 20–24, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS 
(D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010) (in-state requirement repealed, case settled); Missouri 
ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386 S.W.3d 165, 175 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (in-state requirement repealed, case dropped); see also In re 
Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 511 (R.I. 2011) 
(declining to address the claims of unconstitutionality); Complaint, Riggs v. 
Curran, No. 1:15-CV-00343-S-LDA (D.R.I. Aug. 13, 2015); Notice of Appeal of 
Appellants Champaign County and Goshen, Union and Urbana Townships, In re 
Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., No. 2013-1874 (Ohio Nov. 26, 2013); 
Comm’n Review of its Rules for the Alt. Energy Portfolio Standard, No. 13-0652-
EL-ORD, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 15, 2014) (in-state 
requirement repealed); Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement, No. 
4185 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 16, 2010). 
 11. Joined Cases C‑204/12 & C‑208/12, Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse 
Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, 2014 E.C.R. I-2192, ¶ 
40; Case C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, 2014 E.C.R. I-
2037, ¶ 25; Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-
2159, ¶ 26. 
 12. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 1.7(c), WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (May 
6, 2013); see also Request for Consultations by the United States, India – 
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, at 1, 2, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 11, 2013); Request for Consultations by China, European 
Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, at 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012). 
 13. See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(deciding whether Colorado’s RPS program violated the dormant commerce 
clause), cert. denied, 136 U.S. 595 (2015). 
 14. See generally North Dakota. v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 15. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 
2015 WL 5665232, at *2, *4 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2015). 
3
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support would burden nuclear energy, including that from out-of-
state.16  The EU Commission, in turn, advised Austria not to ban 
the import of nuclear power with reference to its impact on free 
trade.17  In the context of WTO law, Argentina has already 
requested consultations with the EU under the WTO regime to 
address its claim that EU sustainability criteria on biofuels in 
practice favour European fuels over Argentinean fuels and, 
therefore, contradict rules of free trade.18  Finally, importing 
states, like the EU, have proposed restrictions on the imports of 
tar sands,19 and Canada has stated that it will take action.20  
These cases on PPM rules can be expected to increase with more 
states taking sustainability action.21 
Rules and restrictions on PPMs adopted by states raise 
questions related to the extraterritorial effects and objectives of 
these rules. The intention here is to illustrate how tests of 
extraterritoriality are taking shape in trade law. The 
developments in trade law are framed against the backdrop of 
limiting negative externalities to optimize utility or welfare as an 
economic—or perhaps even ethical—theory. Yet, as this article 
concludes, the question of whose or which externalities are given 
 
 16. Amended Complaint, Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick L.L.C. v. Ziebelman, 
No. 15-cv-230 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015). 
 17. Claus Hecking, Umstrittenes Umweltgezetz: Osterreich Stoppt Import von 
Atomstrom, SPIEGEL (July 3, 2013, 2:47 PM), www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/ 
energiewende-oesterreichs-totaler-atomausstieg-a-909206.html 
[https://perma.cc/8EH2-6KDZ]; Markus Stingl, Kompromiss im Atom-Streit, 
KURIER (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/kompromiss-im-
atom-streit/774.061 [https://perma.cc/R8HC-N4CM]. 
 18. Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Union and Certain 
Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of 
Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, at 3–4, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS459/1 (May 15, 2013). 
 19. See James Crisp, Canada Tar Sand Will Not Be Labelled ‘Dirty’ After All, 
EURACTIV.COM (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/canada-
tar-sands-will-not-be-labelled-dirty-after-all-310910 [https://perma.cc/9DG7-
W9H2] (noting that the final agreement on assigning tar sands a higher 
emission value was never struck and the approach was abandoned in December 
2014); see also Directive 2009/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 88, 88–89 (requiring that 
fuel refiners reduce the GHG intensity of sold fuel). 
 20. Damian Carrington, Canada Threatens Trade War with EU over Tar 
Sands, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2012, 5:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2012/feb/20/canada-eu-tar-sands [https://perma.cc/JW5N-KLCM]. 
 21. THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 230 (J.H.H. Weiler ed. 2000). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3
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relevance may need to be determined by other principles or 
perceptions of “fairness.” 
In this article, PPM rules are analyzed under three 
jurisdictions: the United States, the EU, and the WTO. The 
approach is justified by the fact that their rules on interstate 
trade reflect very similar basic objectives related to anti-
protectionism. Moreover, the regimes, to a large extent, share the 
same structure of rules on prohibition balanced with rules on 
justification. All in all, the regimes reveal similar syntax. The 
comparability of the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine 
with both WTO law and EU free movement law has been 
highlighted already in previous research.22 
II.  EFFICIENCY AND EXTERNALITIES 
Economic integration and trade law rests on the idea of 
comparative advantages and efficiency gains.23  This applies for 
all three jurisdictions.24  With efficiency so close to the core of 
trade law, it feels natural to view and explain the law from this 
perspective. Posner has taken this analysis even a step further, 
arguing that the efficiency of law is an ethical and scientific 
theory.25 
Efficiency is an overarching concept that covers several, 
partly even conflicting, theories. For example, Jeremy Bentham 
argued for a utilitarian approach to law reform.26  In his model, it 
is utility that should be maximized.27  However, in trade law, 
discrimination is prohibited even if it in some circumstances may 
increase utility in a highly patriotic society. Posner in turn 
argued that welfare maximization could work as a theory for 
 
 22. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1300 (1997). See generally HARRI KALIMO, E-CYCLING: 
LINKING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EC AND THE U.S. (2006). 
 23. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 
737 (1999); Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming 
the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 803 (2012). 
 24. Id. at 804. 
 25. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13 (1981). 
 26. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789). 
 27. See id. 
5
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explaining law.28  Apart from the question of whether utility or 
welfare should be maximized, theories on efficiency also differ 
with regards to the definition of an efficient state of affairs. For 
example, efficiency can be defined as Pareto optimality or Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency.29  These definitions of efficiency have been 
linked to various interpretations of the proportionality test in 
trade law.30 
Regardless of which of the above theories on efficiency is 
adopted, limiting externalities can still play a role. Regulation 
that forces the polluter to take into account the full costs of the 
pollution is said to cause an internalization of the externalities. 
This has been regarded as both efficient and reasonable.31  It has 
also caught the attention of some law and economics scholars.32  
Posner viewed it as the duty of the state to take care of the 
externalities.33 
While states accept the efficiency benefits of free trade, they 
are still granted the right to adopt measures that may prima facie 
contradict the free trade objectives if the measure relies on a 
valid ground of justification. One way to understand the inclusion 
of grounds of justification in trade law is that they legitimize 
measures tackling externalities to achieve an optimal level in the 
society. The balancing of “economic” and “non-economic” values 
thus serves this particular objective.34 
All economic theories, including the free market ideal and the 
idea of limiting externalities, are value-laden.35  In accordance 
 
 28. POSNER, supra note 25, at vii. 
 29. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 399 (Julian Rivers 
trans. 2002). 
 30. See Aurelien Portuese, Principle of Proportionality as Principle of 
Economic Efficiency, 19 EUR. L. J. 612 (2013). 
 31. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 38–40 (2nd 
ed. 1997). 
 32. Particularly, for instance, the Yale School of Law and Economics. See 
Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and 
Economics, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 259, 264 (2004). 
 33. POSNER, supra note 25, at 103. 
 34. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Judicial Review, and 
Global Constitutionalism, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 173, 206 (Giorgio 
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009). 
 35. ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 48–56 (1990); Kenneth L. Avio, Three Problems of Social 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3
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with radical libertarian policies, state intervention should also be 
minimized in the environmental sector. Prohibitions and 
standards set by governments are thus regarded as less efficient 
than a model of clearly defined individual rights in resources and 
social pressure.36  At the other extreme, environmental protection 
is regarded as a good per se, without any need for justification in 
terms of efficiency. According to Ronald Dworkin, wealth and its 
maximization would not even be a component of social value.37  
Sustainable development has so far been linked to human 
development under economic law.38  Yet, that is not the only 
plausible approach and environmental protection could be a goal 
of its own. 
It is not the intention here to argue what must or should be 
understood in terms of efficiency. Principles such as coherence, 
transparency, participation and accountability may equally be 
elements of justice. The aim is instead to explain how trade law 
can be understood in terms of efficiency, more specifically through 
limiting externalities, and what the limits of such approach may 
be in light of recent case law developments concerning 
extraterritoriality. 
III.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE LAW OF 
PROHIBITION 
A.  Background and U.S. Case Law 
The PPM may or may not affect the physical characteristics 
of the end product. For example, biofuels may be produced from 
various resources with more or less sustainable methods. The 
difference in the process may to some extent be reflected in the 
properties of the fuel. Electricity, in turn, is always an identical 
product regardless of whether it was produced from fossil fuels 
through a process of high pollution or if it was produced from 
renewable resources. 
 
Organisation: Institutional Law and Economics Meets Habermasian Law and 
Democracy, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 501, 503 (2002). 
 36. Libertarian Party, Libertarian Party Platform (June 2014), https:// 
www.lp.org/files/2014_LP_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FRR-WQ3G]. 
 37. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 195 (1980). 
 38. Emily B. Lydgate, Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual 
Supportiveness to Balancing, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 632–33 (2012). 
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State regulations that set sustainability criteria for the PPMs 
of energy do not primarily target the environmental effects of 
consumption in the importing state. Such effects would depend on 
the physical characteristics of the good. Instead, the rules target 
the sustainability of the production phase, which, with respect to 
imports, takes place out-of-state. This has raised questions as to 
what extent state regulation may have extraterritorial effects. 
Extraterritoriality in the law of justification deals with the 
geographical scope of the environment that the state aims to 
protect and will be dealt with in later sections. This section 
focuses on extraterritoriality in the law of prohibition. 
Under international law, states may rely on a broad range of 
tests in order to establish a link between the state and what is 
regulated.39  The jurisdiction of U.S. states is also limited to their 
territory and states should not regulate in the jurisdiction of 
other states.40  One of the objectives of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is to guarantee that those without political representation 
are not burdened.41  Unlike in international law and EU law 
where the prohibition of extraterritorial regulation stems from 
general principles, the extraterritoriality test has become an 
integral part of the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 
even if it could equally well be viewed as a separate general 
principle of federalism.42 
The Dormant Commerce Clause targets protectionism in the 
form of discrimination but also prohibits extraterritorial 
measures. A finding of extraterritoriality is often fatal for the 
 
 39. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–20 (Sept. 7, 
1927). 
 40. Patrick Zomer, Note, The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 60, 80 (2011). 
 41. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989) (laying out the Complete 
Auto test), abrogated by Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 136 S. Ct. 
1787 (2015); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185–86 
(1938) (laying out the political representation test); see also Patricia 
Weisselberg, Comment, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can 
California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power 
Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 
207–08 (2007). 
 42. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State 
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1873 (1987). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3
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state measure since it may be either declared unconstitutional,43 
or subject to strict scrutiny.44  The extraterritoriality test has 
mostly been applied in connection with price affirmation laws.45  
These are laws by which the state has tried to influence the 
prices in its market by regulating, for example, that imports 
should not have been purchased below a minimum price or that 
companies cannot export to other states for a lower price. 
The extraterritoriality test probably could have been applied 
with equal reference to competitive advantages and protectionist 
behavior.46  A characteristic of depriving the competitive 
advantage of out-of-state industries is namely that it tends to 
reduce imports and that is what the price affirmation laws 
appeared to do.47  The Supreme Court has in any case 
emphasized the need for economic unity and formulated the 
extraterritoriality test to prohibit directly regulating out-of-state 
commerce, regulating conduct wholly outside the state, or 
practically controlling commerce wholly out-of-state.48  Finally, 
the Court may also invalidate a measure if it creates norm 
conflicts or could create such conflicts if many states adopted 
similar measures.49 
 
 43. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 
1995); see also Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 
1999) (per curiam). 
 44. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 45. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336-37 (1989); Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 46. See Energy & Envt’l Legal v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171–74 (10th Cir. 
2015) (upholding Colorado’s renewable energy mandate finding it neither a price 
control statute nor discriminatory to out-of-state consumers or producers), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015); see also Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (appearing to 
have realized the underlying protectionism); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case 
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243, 293–94 (1999); cf. Report of 
the Panel, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks 
by Provincial Marketing Agencies, ¶ 5.31, DS17/R (Feb. 18, 1992) (finding 
discrimination in the case of a minimum price law). 
 47. Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade 
Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs, 3 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 122 (2013). 
 48. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 336–37; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 
U.S. at 579; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982). 
 49. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642. 
9
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It has been argued that the extraterritoriality test would only 
apply to price control schemes.50  The test was, however, applied 
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which concerned an Illinois decision to 
restrict the acquisition of shares by a non-Illinois company from 
non-Illinois shareholders.51  A very different case emerged in 
Wisconsin, when the State adopted a regulation that restricted 
the import of waste from other states that was not sufficiently 
recycled. This measure could be categorized as an end-of-life 
treatment rule targeting not just specific business transactions 
but also state-wide policy.52  The Seventh Circuit ruled against 
the measure, concluding that such end-of-life treatment rule 
targeting the policy of other states was extraterritorial.53  An 
amended version of the law that only allowed imports from states 
with a recycling standard also did not survive a legal challenge.54  
Rules on production methods and end-of-life treatment are 
similar in the sense that both may address aspects of 
sustainability that often leave no trace in the physical 
characteristics of the good.55  Hence, the principle of the case 
could probably be extended to apply for PPM rules that target 
state policies or standards. 
 
 50. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2013); 
Energy & Envt’l Legal, 793 F.3d at 1173–74. 
 51. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642; see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 
362, 377–79 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that non-
discriminatory state laws may still violate the extraterritoriality doctrine); 
Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l. Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 
2003) (stating it would not be prohibited extraterritorial regulation if at least 
one party of a regulated contract would be located in-state). 
 52. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 
1995) (discussing the district court’s finding that the statute’s notable local 
benefits outweighed its small impact on interstate commerce). As a comparison, 
in EU public procurement law and under the international Government 
Procurement Agreement, (sustainability) criteria that apply to general company 
policy and do not relate to the subject matter of the individual contract are 
prohibited. Abby Semple, A Link to the Subject-Matter: A Glass Ceiling for 
Sustainable Public Contracts? 9 (Univ. of London Dep’t of Politics, Working 
Paper, 2014). 
 53. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 63 F.3d at 658, 661, 663. 
 54. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
 55. LIFE CYCLE INITIATIVE, TOWARDS A LIFE CYCLE SUSTAINABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 11 (2011). 
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B.  Creating Incentives Out-of-State and Market Access 
Drawing the line between when a state is impermissibly 
regulating out-of-state conduct and when it is not is no easy task. 
Some relevance might be given to where the primary transaction 
takes place. Hence, if the primary transaction is wholly out-of-
state, the risk of finding the act unconstitutional is greater than 
if the primary transaction is an interstate transaction.56  PPM 
rules target imports and would, therefore, as a rule, not easily fall 
inside the scope of illegal extraterritoriality. 
The problem of PPM rules is illustrated well by the case of 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, where the court 
referred to the extraterritoriality doctrine.57  The case concerned 
the California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), a standard 
that is applied to favour low-emitting transport fuels, such as 
various forms of biofuels.58  A life-cycle analysis (LCA) was 
applied to estimate the emissions of fuel pathways.59  The LCA 
for a pathway incorporated emissions from growing the feedstock, 
the refinery process (including efficiency and the source for 
electricity used in operation), and the transport distances.60  
California had calculated default values for several pathways but 
also allowed producers to certify the emissions levels of their 
individual production process.61  Fuels with high emissions 
values were not barred from entering the market, but, since the 
fuels supplied by retailers on average must not exceed certain 
levels of pollution, those fuels with high emissions are given 
lower priority.62 
The LCFS awarded in-state bioethanol a lower default 
emissions value than for Midwest bioethanol.63  To that end, both 
 
 56. Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 344–45 (2013). 
 57. 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev'd in part, 730 F.3d 1070 
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding that LCFS regulations were not facially discriminatory 
nor extraterritorial). 
 58. Id. at 1079–80. 
 59. Id. at 1081. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1082. 
 62. Id. at 1082, 1086–87. 
 63. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087. 
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the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the question of discrimination and discussed the 
doctrine of extraterritoriality. The district court reached the 
conclusion that the LCFS was unconstitutional.64  Regulating the 
emissions of bioethanol used in California would in fact target the 
production of bioethanol out-of-state. Hence, according to the 
court, the rule controlled extraterritorial conduct.65  The 
reasoning of the district court would, for example, invite the 
conclusion that measures incentivizing the reduction of GHGs 
out-of-state are illegal extraterritorial regulation.66 
The district court also pointed out that if more states adopted 
similar types of rules, producers would face conflicting norms.67  
This is true in the sense that producers utilizing certain feedstock 
and production technology might be excluded from one market, 
but not another. In order to gain access to all states, a producer 
would need to comply with the state with the strictest regulation. 
Under this broad interpretation of illegal extraterritorial effect, 
any PPM rule would likely be prohibited. All PPM rules do at 
least indirectly affect out-of-state conduct, and so do rules that do 
not even concern PPMs.68 
Several scholars have criticized the District Court for the 
Eastern District of California’s application of the 
extraterritoriality test.69  Only measures having a direct 
extraterritorial effect should be prohibited.70  The traditional test 
of extraterritoriality has been whether or not the measure can be 
described as controlling of out-of-state conduct. Limiting the 
scope of extraterritorial effect would mean that control of conduct 
occurs when the state is dictating the commercial conduct in 
another state, but not when it is using its own regulations to 
influence out-of-state commerce by creating incentives.71  The 
 
 64. Id. at 1094. 
 65. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
 66. Cf. Alcorn, supra note 47, at 165 (appearing to disagree with this 
reasoning). 
 67. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 
1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 68. Alcorn, supra note 47, at 163; Engel, supra note 46, at 342. 
 69. See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 47; Lee & Duane, supra note 56. 
 70. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977). 
 71. Robert L. Molinelli, Renewable Energy Development: Surviving the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, RENEWABLE, ALTERNATIVE, & DISTRIBUTED ENERGY 
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difference between controlling and creating incentives is 
obviously a fine line. Daniel Farber has argued that the almost 
per se invalidity of measures caught by the extraterritoriality test 
forms a reason for a narrow test.72  He argues that the Pike 
balancing test, where costs and benefits of the measure are 
compared, is generally a more suitable proportionality test for 
PPM rules.73  It would seem justified to conclude that a PPM rule 
is normally creating only incentives, but it can become obligatory 
when it makes importation conditioned on state policy, as in the 
Meyer cases.74 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court’s ruling on extraterritoriality.75  It stated that California 
had an interest in out-of-state carbon emissions due to its global 
effects.76  Therefore, California had the right to try and influence 
out-of-state conduct through its regulation of contracts in 
California.77  It highlighted that there were no evidence of 
conflicting legal regimes.78  In addition, no state needs to change 
its law in order for its industry to get market access in 
California.79  In this respect, the case was different from the 
Meyer cases. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the measure did 
 
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Sec. Env’t, Energy & Res.), Sept. 2012, at 
5–6. But see Margaret Tortorella, Note, Will the Commerce Clause “Pull the 
Plug” on Minnesota’s Quantification of Environmental Externalities of Electricity 
Production?, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1547, 1574–75 (1995). 
 72. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided 
Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3 TRANSNAT’L 
ENVTL. L. 31, 43 (2014). 
 73. Id.; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (leaving the 
impression that Pike balancing could apply even with findings of 
extraterritoriality, especially if it cannot be linked to any discriminatory effects). 
 74. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1151 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 652 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
 75. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 76. See id. 1098–1100. 
 77. Id. at 1098–1101; see also Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 
F.3d 1154, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a state regulation requiring 
ocean vessels sailing outside the shore of the state not to exceed a threshold for 
sulfur emissions, although putting a restraint on vessels from other states 
entering the waters of the state with imports was not deemed to be regulation 
controlling out-of-state conduct). 
 78. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1105. 
 79. Id. at 1102–03. 
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not target production, trade, or use of ethanol in any other 
state.80  What it meant by production is rather unclear. The court 
also emphasized that the PPM rule did not ban imports or 
establish any thresholds.81  Hence, it would seem that the court 
left open the possibility that PPM criteria for market access may 
still breach the extraterritoriality principle. 
The market access string of the extraterritoriality test would 
seem closely related to the general test applicable in EU free 
movement law, which prohibits discrimination in intra-
community trade as well as market access hindrances.82  The 
European test to determine whether a measure is prima facie 
prohibited is much broader than the U.S. test of undue burdens, 
as it is not limited to discrimination but also covers cases of some 
significant hindrances to market access in general.83  What 
recent U.S. case law may suggest is a more limited application of 
the test, since it would only apply in connection with findings of 
extraterritoriality. Yet, extending the scope of prima facie 
prohibited measures that far may not be received well in the 
United States, bearing in mind the view held by some Supreme 
Court Justices that the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine is 
too broad.84  One should also note that defining the boundaries of 
the market access test in the EU has proved to be problematic. 
The question of extraterritoriality has been addressed in at 
least three further recent cases in the field of energy. In American 
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers. v. O’Keeffe, the district 
court followed the reasoning in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
when it upheld the LCFS as implemented in Oregon.85  In Energy 
& Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel, Colorado’s RPS was at 
 
 80. Id. at 1102. 
 81. See id. at 1102–03. 
 82. Max S. Jansson & Harri Kalimo, De Minimis Meets “Market Access”: 
Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free 
Movement Law?, 51 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 523, 524–26 (2014); cf. CTS Corp. 
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83–84 (1987) (emphasizing that the 
measure does not prohibit trade altogether but still finding the act to be prima 
facie prohibited). 
 83. See Jansson & Kalimo, supra note 82, at 524–25. 
 84. See Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 153 S. Ct. 1787, 1811–12 (2015) 
(5–4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. No. 3:15-CV-00467-AA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128277, at *19 (D. Or. 
Sept. 23, 2015). 
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stake.86  Among other things, the claimants challenged the 
constitutionality of promoting renewables through an RPS with 
tradeable renewable energy credits (RECs).87  The district court 
ruled that such system regulates the PPM of out-of-state 
electricity only when imported to Colorado.88  Moreover, in 
applying to such inter-state trade, the system only created 
incentives for certain PPMs and did not set any standard for 
market access.89  The approach in other words resembled that of 
the Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.90  It should be 
emphasized that the Supreme Court has not yet confirmed the 
narrow interpretation of the extraterritoriality test in the context 
of PPM rules. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota 
appeared to apply a somewhat broader interpretation in North 
Dakota v Heydinger.91  Minnesota had adopted a coal moratorium 
by deciding not to grant permits to any new coal plants in-state 
and by prohibiting imports from out-of-state new coal plants and 
long-term agreements with energy plants that may increase state 
power sector carbon emissions.92  North Dakota and its coal 
companies challenged the law.93  The court observed that some 
electricity cooperatives out-of-state have members in 
Minnesota.94  In accordance with the law, these could not be 
customers of electricity from coal. However, electricity is 
generated to a multi-state grid. Thus, as a practical matter, the 
Minnesota law also directly affected transactions with no parties 
from Minnesota.95  The court concluded that the law had 
 
 86. No. 1:11-cv-00859, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60567, at *5 (D. Colo. May 1, 
2014). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1179 (D. Colo. 
2014). 
 89. Id. at 1179–80. 
 90. Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015). 
 91. See generally North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 92. Id. at 897. 
 93. Id. at 908. 
 94. Id. at 916. 
 95. Id. at 907. 
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extraterritorial reach, and the ruling was appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit.96 
The ruling in Heydinger does not necessary conflict with the 
case of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. Minnesota targeted 
electricity directly, which, unlike biofuels and RECs, cannot be 
physically segregated once it has entered inter-state grids. Hence, 
the rule would force any party interested to do business in 
Minnesota to change their whole company policy. In contrast, the 
California LCFS would apply only to those individual batches 
imported to California and out-of-state producers could serve the 
markets of other states with dirtier products.97 
Some scholars have equally identified the difference between 
the cases of California and Minnesota, but concluded that the 
special nature of electricity should not have justified a different 
outcome in the Minnesota case.98  Such view would gain some 
support from the decision in the Colorado case, which was also on 
electricity trade. An alternative is that the Minnesota case 
differed from the Colorado case on one critical account—namely, 
that Minnesota created (absolute) conditions for market access, 
whereas the two other states only created market incentives in 
the form of support schemes.99 
James Coleman has argued that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal 
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was flawed and that measures 
to promote renewables would need and should be awarded an 
exemption by Congress.100  Looking at recent cases, the 
arguments for a contrary position appear strong. The 
extraterritoriality test in the law of prohibition should only 
exceptionally capture state regulation on the sustainability of 
PPMs. This conclusion is of crucial importance from the 
perspective of tackling externalities. A stricter extraterritoriality 
test would severely restrict a state’s ability to take measures 
 
 96. Id. at 916–17. See generally Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, North Dakota 
v. Heydinger, No. 14-2156 (8th Cir. Jan. 1, 2016). 
 97. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 98. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, 
Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE 
& ENERGY L. 127, 181–82 (2014). 
 99. Id. at 165. 
 100. James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1384 n.167, 1388–95 (2014). 
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aimed at reducing externalities burdening its residents related to 
climate change or air pollution originating in other states. 
IV.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE LAW OF 
JUSTIFICATION 
A.  Local and Global Objectives 
Nations frequently adopt trade restrictions with the objective 
to protect safety, public health, or the environment within their 
territories. Criteria on the PPMs may, however, not have any 
impact on the qualities of the final product that is imported. At 
the same time, the environmental effects of the PPMs will at least 
originate in the country where production takes place, which, in 
the case of imports, is another country. The adoption of PPM 
criteria has consequently sparked a debate on the question of 
whether states may justify de jure and de facto discriminatory 
trade restrictions with reference to the protection of global health 
and environmental concerns, or even the protection of public 
health and the environment in other states.101  It is, in other 
words, a question of whether or not grounds of justification 
should have extraterritorial reach. 
Treaties like the TFEU, GATT, and the TBT Agreement 
include the protection of public health as a ground of justification 
without any explicit limitations to the geographical scope of that 
objective.102  In light of the purpose of those trade law regimes, 
though, some limitations may exist. Namely, with the 
establishment of a free trade area, states have given up on some 
of their sovereignty to decide on what goods to allow for import. 
The grounds of justification can be understood as a safeguard 
against, for example, environmental threats. Their purpose is not 
 
 101. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. 
at 262. 
 102. This is in contrast to the SPS Agreement (Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401), 
under which the only protection of national resources can justify exemptions to 
the main free trade principles. The agreement is, however, to some degree of a 
different nature than the GATT or the TBT. See generally KYLE BAGWELL & 
ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM (2002) (for 
arguments of a more narrow interpretation of GATT and the TBT Agreement, 
which would strengthen coherence with the SPS Agreement). 
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to offer Member States a tool to use trade policy only in order to 
pressure other Member States to commit to policy changes, in, for 
example, the environmental field or human rights protection. 
In some early decisions, WTO panels appeared to view it 
necessary that the justifiable benefit strived for is domestic.103  In 
United States – Tuna (Mexico I), the panel condemned unilateral 
measures on PPMs on the ground that they would endanger the 
multilateral trade system.104  The panel still did not fully close 
the door for accepting measures that target the protection of the 
environment beyond the national borders.105  In United States – 
Tuna (EC), the panel was more favourable towards 
extraterritorial environmental objectives.106  The panel concluded 
that protecting dolphins beyond U.S. borders was a legitimate 
objective, even if the measure in the end could not be justified as 
it did not pass the necessity test.107 
The panel arrived at its conclusion in part by examining 
Article XX as a whole.108  Article XX includes grounds of 
justification such as the protection of public health and the 
conservation of natural resources.109  The panel noted that in 
accordance with Article XX(e) states could also justify restrictions 
on trade in products of prison labour.110  Such restrictions would 
be adopted for moral reasons and would relate to the protection 
prisoners in foreign states. Hence, it reasoned that environmental 
protection objectives could at least not categorically be 
 
 103. Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶¶ 7.200-.210, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003). 
 104. Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 
5.27, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) GATT BISD (39th Supp.) [hereinafter United States 
– Tuna (Mexico I)]; see also Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.40–.61, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (May 
15, 1998). 
 105. United States – Tuna (Mexico I), supra note 104, ¶¶ 5.25–.27. 
 106. See Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
¶¶ 5.13–.20. DS29/R (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter United States – Tuna (EC)]. 
 107. Id. ¶¶ 5.13–.20; see also Report of the Panel, Canada – Measures Affecting 
the Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, ¶¶ 4.2–.7, L/6268 (Mar. 22, 
1988), GATT BISD (35th Supp.); Report of the Panel, United States – 
Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, ¶¶ 4.4–.15 
L/5198 (adopted Feb. 22 1982), GATT BISD (29th Supp.), at 91, 112-14. 
 108. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶¶ 5.13–.20. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. ¶¶ 5.16–.17. 
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prohibited.111  An alternative reading of XX(e) would have been 
plausible. One could understand the permitted objective of 
protecting foreign prisoners to form lex specialis in relation to the 
public morals,112 which is referred to as a ground of justification 
in Article XX(a).113  Consequently, XX(a) and other paragraphs 
under Article XX may not necessarily have the same geographical 
scope as Article XX(e). 
As a side note, in United States – Tuna (EC), the Europeans 
together with several other states argued against unilateral 
PPMs with extraterritorial environmental objectives.114  
However, the EU has, as a union, more recently developed 
criteria for sustainable PPMs that apply globally, for example, to 
biofuels. The devil is probably in the detail and the position of the 
EU may be related to precisely how the criteria have been 
implemented. 
A note by the secretariat after United States – Tuna (EC) 
stated that the protection of resources within the nation may be a 
ground of justification.115  The dispute settlement bodies had to 
return to this issue in United States – Shrimp.116  There, the 
Appellate Body discussed the objective of protecting turtles 
outside of U.S. waters.117  The Appellate Body pointed out that 
the species of turtles in question are endangered and that they 
migrate.118  The migration of turtles may be a crucial point. Since 
turtles migrate, it was no longer possible to separate domestically 
protected and foreign turtles. In other words, the environmental 
protection objective of the United States concerned a global 
resource. Although the Appellate Body finally concluded that the 
 
 111. See id. ¶¶ 5.16–.17, 5.20. 
 112. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶ 3.41. 
 113. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. at 
262. 
 114. See United States – Tuna (Mexico I), supra note 104, ¶ 4.11 (noting the 
EU’s disproval of the United States’ unilateral PPM measure under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act). 
 115. Note by the Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 
Relating to Article XX Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of GATT, ¶¶ 27–30, WTO Doc. 
WT/CTE/W/53 (July 30, 1997). 
 116. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 132–33, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct.12, 
1998) [hereinafter United States – Shrimp (AB)]. 
 117. Id. ¶¶ 115–134. 
 118. Id. ¶¶ 132–33. 
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design of the U.S. law was arbitrary, it has accepted that 
measures, in principle, could be justified with reference to the 
protection of migratory species.119 
The United States later abolished the arbitrary elements of 
the law, but the law was still challenged by Malaysia. The 
Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp (Article 21.5) noted 
that, in accordance with the Rio Declaration of 1992, states 
should, as far as possible, aim to address global environmental 
challenges through international consensus.120  The Appellate 
Body recognized that although the declaration sets a preference 
for international action, it does not exclude the possibility of 
unilateral measures.121  In addition, it is non-binding and may 
only serve as a source for interpreting WTO provisions. Hence, 
WTO law could at least not categorically prohibit the 
extraterritorial scope of justifications.122 
It may be recalled that while the United States has defended 
its federal PPM rules in the WTO, there has been great 
scepticism in the United States toward PPM rules adopted by its 
states and their compatibility with the Constitution.123  
Similarly, the EU Commission has generally been very sceptical 
of unilateral PPM criteria. The disapproval of Dutch labels on 
sustainable forestry illustrates this.124  However, some Member 
States have recently developed sustainability criteria for solid 
biomass that relies on a life-cycle assessment,125 and the 
 
 119. United States – Shrimp (AB), supra note 116, ¶¶ 133, 177–186. 
 120. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 
¶ 124, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
 121. Id. 
 122. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶ 3.16. The United States also 
argued Article XX(c) illustrated the same point, since, under that paragraph, 
states may implement restrictions on the import and export of gold and silver. 
Id. 
 123. See supra Part III. 
 124. Compare JOCHEM WIERS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE EC AND THE 
WTO: A LEGAL ANALYSIS  360–361 (1st ed. 2002) (finding that sustainable forest 
management is an acceptable objective), with Case C-448/01, EVN AG & 
Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-14527 (reflecting the Commission’s 
long-standing view that environmental and social PPMs unrelated to the 
characteristics of the end product may not be applied as, e.g., award criteria in 
public procurement, even if that position is overruled by the ECJ). 
 125. See, e.g., Erin Voegele, UK Sets Sustainability Standards for Solid 
Biomass, Biogas, BIOMASS MAG.  (Aug. 22, 2013), http://biomassmagazine.com/ 
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Commission appears to have encouraged such development 
without any notable concerns for the functioning of the internal 
market.126 
The EU has perhaps not adopted any consistent view on 
extraterritoriality.127  However, in principle, the United States 
and the EU could advocate for a different interpretation in WTO 
law than either applies in its own trade regime because, within 
their own systems, the United States and the EU try to foster 
coherency and mutual trust, which may provide stronger 
arguments against extraterritoriality than would be the case in 
the more heterogenic WTO community.128 
It has indeed been argued in the context of EU free 
movement law that member states can only justify measures with 
reference to the protection of health and environment within its 
national borders.129  However, Advocate-General van Gerven once 
took the view that when environmental issues can have trans-
frontier effects, a Member State should be justified in trying to 
reduce it even if the source is located outside its jurisdiction.130 
 
articles/9363/uk-sets-sustainability-standards-for-solid-biomass-biogas 
[https://perma.cc/5CYU-YGZ7]. See generally U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE 
CHANGE, IA NO: DECC0134, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE 
SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF SOLID AND GASEOUS BIOMASS 
FEEDSTOCKS UNDER THE RENEWABLES OBLIGATION (RO) 7–8 (2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/41
5168/RO_Biomass_Sustainability_Govt_Response_Impact_Assessment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/55LA-ZYYJ ] (revealing that the preparatory works contained 
some discussion on the relation to EU free movement law); MINISTRY OF ECON. 
AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION OF SOLID BIOMASS FOR 
ENERGY PRODUCTION (2013), http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/ 
Module_200.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM4S-2SM8] (discussing similar criteria 
developed in Belgium and the Netherlands). 
 126. Commission Staff Working Document: State of Play on the Sustainability 
of Solid and Gaseous Biomass Used for Electricity, Heating and Cooling in the 
EU, at 9-11, SWD (2014) 259 final (July 28, 2014). 
 127. WIERS, supra note 124, at 363–65. 
 128. THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE?, supra note 21, at 138. 
 129. Case 8/74, Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Procureur du Roi v. 
Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5; see also Case C-5/94, The Queen v. 
Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 
E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 20; ANDREAS R. ZIEGLER, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  84 (1996). 
 130. Case C-169/89, Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven in Criminal 
Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2151, ¶ 7; see 
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The case van Gerven analyzed, referred to as Van den Burg, 
related to a Dutch ban on the import of red grouse, a bird not 
found in the Netherlands.131  Although a bird conservation 
directive authorized states to adopt stricter measures, the ECJ 
concluded that such measures could only relate to domestically 
occurring migratory and endangered birds.132  The court 
interpreted the directive and Article 36 of the TFEU jointly, 
which resulted in some confusion as regards to the applied 
principles.133  The protection of migratory birds appeared 
justifiable, but it was left unclear as to whether this stemmed 
from the Treaty or the Directive. The case, however, gives some 
reason to believe that the ECJ is sympathetic to the objective of 
protecting global harms.134  This is further supported by its 
reasoning in a case on the compatibility of airports with 
international customary law with the application of the EU 
Emissions Trading System on airlines from outside countries 
landing within the EU.135  Although the case did not relate to free 
movement law, it is worthy of note that the court made reference 
to the global impacts of pollutions outside EU airspace to support 
the argument that the EU had an interest to regulate flight 
emissions outside its airspace and that the extraterritorial reach 
of the ETS was justifiable in light of international law.136 
The issue of extraterritoriality in law of justification has also 
been tackled under the Dormant Commerce Clause.137  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled that prima facie prohibited measures 
may be justified in case of a legitimate local goal.138  This would 
 
also Ludwig Krämer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 111, 136 (1993). 
 131. See Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den 
Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2160, ¶ 2. 
 132. Id. ¶ 12. 
 133. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
 134. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
 135. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. & Others v. Sec’y of State for 
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, ¶¶ 108, 125, 128. 
 136. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. & Others v. Sec’y of State for 
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, ¶ 129. 
 137. Zomer, supra note 40, at 31–32; see also DAMIEN GERADIN, TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EC AND US LAW  66 (1997) (rejecting 
any extraterritorial dimension with regards to the grounds of justification in US 
and EU Law). 
 138. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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imply that states may introduce measures to protect its own local 
environment, but not to protect the environment of other states. 
The Court has also highlighted that states have no legitimate 
interest in protecting non-residents.139 
However, lower courts have ruled that the protection of out-
of-state wildlife is a legitimate objective. 140  Protecting wildlife 
would in part also protect the fauna of the state implementing the 
measure at least when the animals are migratory. What is more, 
at least on one occasion, a lower court has concluded that 
protecting out-of-state health was a legitimate objective when 
adopted in conjunction with the objective of protecting in-state 
reputation.141  This would suggest that the protection of out-of-
state interests might be thought of as acceptable at least when 
the measure in part also advances some in-state objective. It 
must be emphasized that these rulings do not form precedents. 
They however illustrate the difficulty of defining the concept of 
“local.” 
In sum, it would appear that neither the U.S. nor the EU 
regime contradicts the WTO law praxis to include global effects, 
although, admittedly, undisputable precedent is lacking.142  It 
would seem difficult to argue that a state should not have the 
right to adopt trade restricting measures that may protect global 
environmental resources because even if the behavior that is 
targeted takes place abroad, the environmental effects of the 
measure will at least indirectly take place within domestic 
borders and each state should have the right to protect against 
harm inflicted on its territory.143  To put it differently, not 
 
 139. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). 
 140. Cresenzi Bird Importers Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1448 
(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987); Palladio Inc. v. Diamond, 321 
F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971); A. E. 
Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d 118, 122–23 (N.Y. 1970). 
 141. Gov’t Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279–
80 (7th Cir. 1992) (concerning a ban on export of food in a truck that had been 
used to import garbage). 
 142. LUDWIG KRÄMER, E.C. TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 111–14 (3d ed. 
1998) (arguing for global effects as legitimate objectives in and EU law context); 
see also GERADIN, supra note 137, at 32, 32 n.104 (pointing out the uncertainty 
regarding this question). Compare KRÄMER, supra, with ZIEGLER, supra note 
129, at 86–88 (presenting a more critical opinion). 
 143. ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 112–113 
(2007). 
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accepting any global harm as a ground for justification would 
significantly restrict the right of states to tackle externalities. 
B.  Global Environmental Protection, the Energy Sector, 
and De Minimis 
Clean air and climate change concerns are global interests 
much like migratory turtles. GHGs have a global reach and their 
emission in any country or state will harm all states.144  Thus, 
reducing carbon dioxide in any part of the world will create global 
environmental benefits and therefore also local benefits for the 
state adopting the measure.145  PPM requirements that also cover 
energy imports would contribute to less pollution abroad, which 
also should improve the air domestically. The Ninth Circuit 
appeared to endorse this view when, in its analysis of the 
compatibility with the Dormant Commerce Clause of the 
sustainability requirements on biofuels in California’s LCFS, it 
concluded that GHGs emitted as a result of PPMs in any state 
would hurt California to a similar extent.146  PPM criteria that 
tackle GHGs should serve a legitimate objective also in EU and 
WTO law,147 even if some authors have expressed reservations in 
this regard.148 
Concerns that states with vast market power would gain 
extensive influence over environmental policy worldwide form the 
primary argument against a broad geographical scope for 
legitimate objectives.149  Where powers such as the United 
 
 144. Thomas R. Karl & Kevin E. Trenberth, Modern Global Climate Change, 
302 SCI. 1719, 1719–20 (2003); Joseph Allan MacDouglad, Why Climate Law 
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State 
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2008); Rachel 
Feinberg Harrison, Comment, Carbon Allowances: A New Way of Seeing an 
Invisible Asset, 62 SMU L REV. 1915, 1917 (2009). 
 145. See Zomer, supra note 40, at 65 (discussing GHG emission mitigation as a 
global/federal public good from the perspective of non-discrimination). 
 146. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080–81 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 147. CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND 
WTO LAW 226–27 (2009). 
 148. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 619 (2013); PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 209–13 (2005). 
 149. MAVROIDIS, supra note 148, at 212; HOWSE, supra note 143, at 111. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3
JANSSON - FINAL 5/4/2016  6:43 PM 
2016] EXTRATERRITORIALITY & TRADE 461 
States, China, or the EU implement PPM requirements that also 
apply to imports, the exporting industry of smaller nations will 
have little option but to change their production and processing 
methods if they wish their industry to survive. The same concerns 
apply to some extent of course to environmental and health 
regulation that apply directly to products and not PPMs. 
However, criteria for sustainable PPMs could be regarded as an 
even more aggressive form of social or environmental imperialism 
practiced by those states that throughout history have gained 
their economic advantages over the developing world in part due 
to lax past environmental regulation. 
Farber has argued that a balance should be struck between 
localism and globalism.150  A model of localism, where states can 
only justify the protection of their own environment, would seem 
insufficient, as it would turn a blind eye to the need of protecting 
global environmental harm, whereas a model of globalism, where 
even the out-of-state share of environmental effects form part of 
the legitimate objective, may shift too much power to nations 
with economic power.151  A test that focuses on global effects, 
which may reach the state adopting the restriction, would offer 
some type of compromise between the two extremes. Yet, such 
test will be difficult to apply consistently in practice. 
Even if states may have a legitimate interest to address 
global GHGs, it has been argued that other pollutants emitted in 
processing resources to generate energy only have a local 
reach.152  For example, wind and hydropower stations mainly 
interfere with the local ecology, even if some GHGs are 
emitted.153  However, even if effects are mainly local, they will in 
the long term become global. Importantly, soil or water pollution 
as well as biodiversity effects are not necessarily any less severe 
than emissions and pollution in the air. Various forms of air and 
water pollution cause environmental harm that will travel from 
one end of the United States, the EU, or even the world, to the 
 
 150. Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographical Nexus in 
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1273 (1996). 
 151. Id. at 1270–73. 
 152. Zomer, supra note 40, at 72. 
 153. Joseph V. Spadaro, Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Electricity Generating 
Chains: Assessing the Difference, 42 INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 19, 20 
(2010). 
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other end.154  As all environmental effects, sooner or later, will 
have a global impact and consequently and will also reach the 
state with the intention of adopting a restrictive measure, all 
measures promoting environmental protection can be claimed to 
benefit also the local environment. Consequently, Engel has 
argued that states do have a legitimate interest in mitigating all 
environmental harm that emerges out-of-state.155 
The difficulties associated with the distinction of global 
environmental effects from purely local effects in out-of-state 
territories have sparked proposals of some form of de minimis 
rule.156  Wiers suggests that the environmental objective should 
be accepted only if the threat would have a direct, substantial and 
foreseeable effect on the domestic environment.157  In the energy 
sector, GHG emissions belong to those environmental concerns 
that are clearly not purely foreign and would not be affected by a 
de minimis threshold. The test would give green light to the 
objective of fighting global climate change. Such test may, 
however, have implications for other forms of pollution and 
environmental risks. These include noise (from wind turbines), 
soil contamination, biodiversity loss (from biofuels feedstock 
plantation), waste (in the form of solar panels) or interference 
with waterways (hydropower). 
In reality, even without a de minimis test, there is a definite 
possibility that when the cross-border environmental benefit is 
very minimal, the state implementing the PPM rule will fail to 
defend its measure as proportional. Some caution is still called 
for. Any de minimis or proportionality test would need to be 
applied so that it would not create a bias against slowly 
accumulating severe effects nor against rare but severe incidents, 
such as nuclear accidents. Hence, any potential test could take 
into account both the magnitude and the probability of cross-
border harm, but would need to be applied with a long-term 
perspective on the effects. It should also be highlighted that such 
 
 154. Anne Havemann, Comment, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How 
Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal 
Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 873 (2012). 
 155. Engel, supra note 46, at 342–48. 
 156. See, e.g., Jansson & Kalimo, supra note 82. 
 157. WIERS, supra note 124, at 274. 
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tests creating a de minimis threshold would, to a small degree, 
bar states from tackling externalities. 
C.  Purely Out-of-State Effects 
1.  Protection of Out-of-State Environment 
Global environmental effects are in part local in the sense 
that some of the effects eventually will impact the state that 
adopts the restriction on PPMs. Although arguably all 
environmental effects have this characteristic, a de minimis rule 
would lead to the categorization of some effects with primarily 
out-of-state consequences as falling outside the scope of 
legitimate objectives. Section IV(C) of this paper tackles the 
question of whether even protective measures against purely out-
of-state effects could be justifiable and the theory of a de minimis 
rule consequently could be discarded. 
While some have argued that the interest protected cannot be 
purely foreign;158 others have still not excluded the possibility 
that states could have extraterritorial legitimate interests under 
each of the three jurisdictions.159  This aspect is relevant not only 
in establishing whether, in the first instance, there are any 
legitimate objectives but also in the analysis of whether the 
environmental benefit is proportional in light of the restriction on 
trade. 
Under the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause, the harm shall 
be local in accordance with the test established through case 
law.160  The theory on the exclusion of purely foreign effects from 
the geographical scope of public health and environmental 
protection as grounds of justification has also never really been 
put to test in WTO law, since appellate bodies have always, due 
to the facts of the case, been able to avoid addressing the 
 
 158. Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food ex parte 
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 20; Case 8/74, Opinion of 
Advocate General Trabucchi in Procureur du Roi v. Gustave Dassonville, 1974 
E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5; ZIEGLER, supra note 129, at 84–90. 
 159. KRÄMER, supra note 142, at 134; Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener 
GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 31, 32 (2000); Engel, supra note 46, at 342–48. 
 160. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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question.161  The same is true for ECJ case law. For example, in 
Van den Burg, the court ruled that states could justify stricter 
national rules on bird conservation only if the birds occurred 
domestically, where migratory or had been listed as 
endangered.162  It thus rejected the protection of most birds that 
occur out-of-state. The court may have only interpreted the 
secondary legislation and intended to indicate that the provision 
in the directive awarding Member States some flexibility did not 
have an extraterritorial dimension. Alternatively, the ECJ took 
the position that Article 36 of the TFEU should cover domestic 
interests and global interest related to for example migratory 
species.163  The addition of the interest to protect endangered 
species could be explained by the fact that a serious threat of 
extinction is related to global biodiversity and thus also a 
sufficient concern for states where the species do not occur. The 
ruling of the ECJ, however, did not explicitly address these 
aspects. 
The debate on the protection of extraterritorial effects 
mirrors the discussion in legal theory as to whether the goal of 
maximization of utility or welfare should also include the 
positions of foreign individuals.164  To the extent environmental 
effects do not affect the territory of a state in any sense, states 
would have limited interests in environmental protection. In 
principle, a nation could argue that it aims to eliminate the 
externalities of some out-of-state minority that has been 
unsuccessful to push for their interests in the legislative process 
in their own state. There are, however, problems with that 
approach. Such minority would normally have a voice and 
representation in the legislative process of their own state and 
interference by another state would appear undemocratic. Future 
generations would obviously not have a voice but it would be 
difficult to justify why a state knows the preference of future 
 
 161. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting 
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.173, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS400/AB/R & WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter EU – Seals 
(AB)]; United States – Shrimp (AB), supra note 116, ¶ 133. 
 162. Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den 
Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2160, ¶¶ 11–12. 
 163. Id. ¶ 16. 
 164. POSNER, supra note 25, at 53–54. 
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generations in another state better than that state itself. 
Potentially, the state adopting the PPM rule could try and argue 
that on the basis of scientific evidence the polluting state is 
endangering its future existence and that it therefore is evident 
that it is harming the utility and/or welfare of its future 
generations.165 
Apart from the concerns related to future generations, it 
should also not be forgotten that the state adopting the measure 
often has at least a minimal environmental interest because of 
the global nature of any pollution. Simultaneously, by furthering 
the interests of its own population and a small group of out-of-
state individuals, the state taking action may in fact tilt the 
outcome of the out-of-state legislative process, which may have 
been the societal optimal internalization of externalities for that 
state. These opposing interests appear very difficult to reconcile. 
2.  The Morality Approach 
The interest of any state to mitigate the out-of-state share of 
environmental effects could alternatively be regarded as a moral 
concern. WTO panels and appellate bodies have often made 
references to other international agreements. These may be 
relevant, as they illustrate the context in which the GATT and 
the TBT are to be interpreted. Both the Stockholm Declaration of 
1972 and the Rio Declaration of 1992 include a commitment by 
the signatories not to cause environmental damage abroad.166  In 
case a state imports products that have been produced in a 
manner that is harmful to the environment, the importing state 
contributes to the environmental damage by increasing the 
demand of the product. The obligation that stems from these 
declarations could even be read to indicate that there actually is 
not only a right to take restrictive actions on PPMs abroad but an 
 
 165. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). This so-
called Brundtland report emphasized that economic development should 
compromise neither present nor future generations. Id. Under trade law, 
externalities may be tackled, but, with a lack of representation, the interests of 
future generations may often be neglected. 
 166. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) (Aug. 12, 
1992); U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the U.N. 
Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 5 (1972). 
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international moral duty.167  Yet, the declarations are not legally 
binding. 
Moving to a legal analysis of legally binding trade law, this 
paper notes that the existence of public morality as a ground of 
justification in the TFEU and the WTO Agreements may prove 
crucial, as it would at least leave the door open for the argument 
that out-of-state environmental effects may fall within the scope 
of the legitimate objective. The grounds of justification listed in 
Article 36 of the TFEU include public morality and policy.168  
Public morality is also mentioned in Article XX(a) of the GATT.169  
Although there is no explicit reference to morals in the TBT 
agreement, the panel has stated that the open list in Article 2.2 
TBT invites parties to rely on public morals as a justification 
ground.170 
The concepts of public policy and morality are fairly abstract 
and vague. In WTO law, for example, public morals have been 
defined as “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by 
or on behalf of a community or nation.”171  The ECJ has accepted 
that limitations on the import of pornographic materials were 
justifiable on moral grounds, and Member States have a wide 
discretion in defining their moral policy.172  In Omega 
Spielhallen, the ECJ stated that games simulating acts of 
homicide could be banned on moral grounds and referred to 
general principles of EU law stemming from internationally 
recognized human rights.173  Internationally recognized 
principles were also referred to in Dynamic Medien, where the 
court accepted that the protection of young children may require 
 
 167. WIERS, supra note 124, at 296 n.245; HOWSE, supra note 143, at 107 n.39. 
 168. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 36. 
 169. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. at 
262. 
 170. Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 7.418, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R 
(Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter EU – Seals]. 
 171. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.465, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 
2004). 
 172. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3797, ¶¶ 15–16. 
 173. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 34–35. 
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limitations on the distribution of videos and images.174  In 
addition, even if the protection against gambling is difficult to 
link directly to any international treaty or principle, the ECJ has 
in several cases confirmed that limitations to gambling may be 
implemented on public policy and moral grounds.175  The same 
approach has applied in WTO law.176  All in all, moral objectives 
do not need to correspond with any broad international 
consensus, but must reflect concerns that can, from an 
international perspective, be regarded as genuinely moral 
concerns. 
Even if public morality and policy would be a valid ground of 
justification, the measures still need to be proportional. One could 
argue that the purpose of a restriction taken by a government on 
moral grounds is, at least in part, to protect the moral 
consciousness of its people. Under such view, most measures 
would easily be deemed suitable and necessary. This approach 
has never been adopted in EU law. Instead, the proportionality of 
the measure has been tested in relation to more concrete 
objectives, for example, child protection,177 or the ECJ has opted 
not to discuss alternative measures in detail.178  In sum, no signs 
have emerged that public morals would extend to the protection 
of environmental effects out-of-state. 
The boundaries of public morals as a ground for justification 
have been extended the furthest in WTO law through a recent 
decision in the EU – Seals case. The case concerned an EU ban on 
the sale and import of seal products due to evidence that many 
are killed in an inhumane manner.179  Only limited exceptions 
 
 174. Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, 
2008 E.C.R. I-533, ¶¶ 39–44. 
 175. Case C-65/05, Comm’n v. Greece, 2006 E.C.R. I-10344, ¶ 31–38; Case C-
243/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Piergiorgio Gambelli & Others, 2003 
E.C.R. I-13076, ¶ 63; Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise v. Gerhart 
Schindler & Jörg Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 60–61. 
 176. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 296–99, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (concerning the application of the GATS); see 
also EU – Seals (AB), supra note 161, ¶¶ 5.177–.179 (accepting the protection of 
seal welfare was accepted as a genuine moral objective in the EU without any 
discussion on international moral views). 
 177. Dynamic Medien, 2008 E.C.R. I-533, ¶ 46. 
 178. Omega Spielhallen, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶ 39. 
 179. See EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.4. 
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covering, for example, seal products sold by Greenlandic Inuits, 
were granted.180  The panel seemed to acknowledge the links 
between health, environment, and morals as it ultimately 
concluded that animal welfare could in principle be protected on 
moral grounds.181  It seemed to imply that the legitimate ground 
of protection was thus seal welfare and the moral implications 
thereof for EU citizens.182  The Appellate Body seemed to approve 
this interpretation, but added that it had no intention to rule on 
the territorial scope of the grounds of justification.183  Hence, the 
legitimate objective could not be interpreted to have been the 
protection of animal health out-of-state. 
By linking animal welfare to morality, the panel and the 
Appellate Body established a broad interpretation that extended 
morals beyond the protection of vulnerable people against the 
negative effects they may inflict on themselves through the 
consumption of goods that are considered morally questionable. 
The unwillingness to rule on the territorial scope of the grounds 
of justification and the subsequent proportionality analysis also 
reveal a broadening of the public morals exception in another 
dimension. To begin with, seals were not deemed migratory nor 
did the AB refer to any benefits on global biodiversity resulting 
from seal protection. The focus was instead on the moral well-
being of EU citizens. With a ban on seal imports, the utility of EU 
citizens were presumed to increase because they would no longer 
participate through consumption in the inhumane killing of seals 
and the total number of inhumanely killed seals would globally 
drop.184  Much analysis was devoted to verifying that the number 
of seals killed inhumanely could be presumed to fall as a result of 
the ban.185 
On the one hand, the protection of public morals and the 
protection of the animal’s health or the environment out-of-state 
 
 180. E.g., EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.4. The exemptions complicate 
the analysis of whether the law actually represented a PPM rule since the ban 
was in part linked to the identity of the hunter and the type of the hunt. See id. 
¶ 7.3. This aspect is, however, not crucial for the analysis in this article. 
 181. See id. ¶¶ 7.3, 7.274, 7.404. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 7.409-.410. 
 183. Id. ¶ 5.173. 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 5.198, 5.222–.226. 
 185. EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 5.234–.254. 
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becomes so intertwined in EU – Seals that morals as a ground of 
justification in practice extends to the protection of “purely” 
extraterritorial health and environment, which was portrayed as 
partly problematic above. On the other hand, by extending the 
interpretation of public morals the panel and the Appellate Body 
invited states to tackle also moral externalities. 
To what extent could the reasoning in EU – Seals then be 
transposed to PPM cases in the energy sector? In its 
proportionality review, the Appellate Body considered 
sustainability labels as a potential alternative to the ban but 
concluded that labels in this case could not achieve the same 
objective.186  The reason for this is that no hunting method 
guarantees humane kills of the seals.187  A labeling scheme may 
thus only result in increased hunts as the hunters need more 
attempts to get humane kills and thus to serve the EU market.188  
Energy may be decisively different in this respect, as the 
sustainability of the PPM is easier to control and labeling a viable 
alternative. Even if moral concerns may arise, states would not 
need to introduce import restrictions, but could allow its 
individual consumers to make the decision to buy or not to buy 
certain forms of energy on the basis of their moral beliefs. This 
would allow consumers to terminate their personal contribution 
to what they feel as immoral and to some degree cause a 
reduction in the morally questionable activity worldwide. The role 
of the state would be narrowed down to ensuring that the 
information on the PPMs of imports is provided on the market. 
Going beyond that could be argued to constitute a form of moral 
imperialism. 
Labeling fuels in accordance with their sustainability would 
not be too much of a problem. Admittedly, electricity would 
present its own challenges as power along wires cannot be 
segregated and individually labeled. Instead, the labeling system 
would need to be linked to contracts, which gives rise to its own 
technical complexities. As a practical matter, electricity trade 
between WTO parties is still very limited. 
 
 186. EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶ 5.278–.279. 
 187. See id. ¶ 5.278. 
 188. Id. ¶ 2.14. 
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On a final note, even if public morals were legitimate and 
applicable grounds of justification in EU – Seals, the Appellate 
Body in the end concluded that the ban fell foul of the GATT due 
to the arbitrary discriminatory nature of the law when taking 
into account the exemptions that had been awarded to, for 
example, Inuit communities.189  This highlights the importance of 
the details of any state measure in ensuring compatibility with 
trade law. 
3.  High Degree of Regional Integration as an 
Explanatory Variable? 
The United States (and also, in fact, the EU) has created not 
only a free trade regime but also an area of free movement of 
persons. Citizens of each state may move easily in the common 
territory of the union. This could create a heightened interest for 
the people of one state in the (environmental) policies of other 
states within the union. Yet, they lack political representation in 
other states and representation through union and federal 
institutions respectively may only partially compensate. These 
observations on the functions of unions and federal states could 
actually provide at least some argument for why globalism—
defined by Farber as the acceptance of pure foreign out-of-state 
environmental protection as a legitimate objective190—could get a 
stronger foothold in trade law of closer unions like the EU and 
the United States. However, as the discussion in previous 
sections revealed, globalism has in fact gained more of a foothold 
under WTO law than in the closer European union. What about 
the United States’ doctrine? 
The test applied in the context of the U.S. Dormant 
Commerce Clause states that the harm must be local.191  Thus, in 
the United States, it has also been argued that mitigating purely 
out-of-state environmental harm does not form a legitimate 
objective.192  The Supreme Court would appear to accept this 
 
 189. EU – Seals (AB), supra note 161, ¶¶ 5.338–.339. 
 190. Farber, supra note 150, at 1272. 
 191. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 192. GERADIN, supra note 137, at 66 (drawing the same conclusion with 
regards to EU law). 
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approach.193  The U.S. doctrine appears even more hostile toward 
globalism than EU free movement law, not to mention WTO law. 
The extraterritoriality doctrine in law of prohibition condemns 
measures that represent the exercise of control over out-of-state 
conduct.194  This already reflects scepticism against the objective 
of states to affect activities in other territories. 
Moreover, under the Dormant Commerce Clause, public 
morality has rarely been discussed as a legitimate objective. For 
example, in 2014, a case was brought relating to the 
constitutionality of a California regulation195 that prohibited 
selling eggs from hens that were kept in cages below a minimum 
size stricter than the federal standard.196  Among other things, 
the complaint has argued that the law breaches the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.197  The emphasis in the arguments was mostly 
on the potential reduction of salmonella risks stemming from the 
well-being of the hens and the contribution that would have for 
local public health in California.198  However, some NGOs have, 
in their amici curiae, claimed that protection against animal 
cruelty is a valid local objective as it links to both health and 
morality.199  This view could gain support from the fact that the 
U.S. Constitution is regarded as leaving questions of morality 
largely to the states.200  Yet, there is still much uncertainty 
around the question of whether morality would be accepted as a 
ground of justification since there are no strong precedents on 
pure moral concerns as legitimate local objectives under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 
All in all, empiricism would not support the theory of a 
positive link between “common union territory” and globalism. 
On the contrary, with a closer union appears to come a stronger 
 
 193. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). 
 194. See supra Part III. 
 195. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 3, § 1350 (2013). 
 196. Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
 197. Complaint ¶ 8, Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-
KJN). 
 198. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1065. 
 199. E.g., Brief for Animal Legal Defense, Fund, Compassion Over Killing, Inc. 
& Farm Sanctuary, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v. 
Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN). 
 200. Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause 
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 886–87 (2005). 
35
JANSSON - FINAL 5/4/2016  6:43 PM 
472 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  33 
rejection of globalism. In fact, the prohibition of extraterritoriality 
in the United States has been linked to national solidarity and 
structural federalism.201  The explanation may also relate to the 
relationship between free trade and morality. The federal system 
of the United States creates a union that, at least in theory, 
should rely on common fundamental values. Consequently, states 
would have no independent morals to protect. Strong unionism 
would thus nullify morality arguments and hence leave the 
globalist approach without any valid justification. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This article started with the presumption that states as 
parties to a free trade regime may utilize the grounds of 
justification to successfully defend attempts to limit externalities. 
Subsequent analysis revealed that only the U.S. Dormant 
Commerce Clause contains an extraterritoriality test in the law of 
prohibition. Although the courts might be shaping a test that 
strikes down measures such as PPM rules that simultaneously 
have a form of extraterritorial effects and that hinder market 
access, such a test should usually not bar the implementation of 
schemes for promoting renewable energy, at least as long as they 
do not have facially discriminatory components such as in-state 
quotas or requirements. 
The analysis of extraterritoriality in law of justification 
proved more complex and the tests may set some limitations to 
permitted measures for dealing with externalities across all three 
jurisdictions. Namely, it follows from the principle of 
representation that the externalities targeted should be those 
experienced on in-state territory. Environmental externalities 
experienced purely by out-of-state individuals are for them to 
tackle through their in-state legislative process. Yet, there are 
almost no environmental effects that would not become global in 
the long term. Here a de minimis threshold may restrict the 
efforts of a state to tackle such minimal effects. Such threshold 
may arise either as a separate test or as a consequence of the 
 
 201. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); Am. Fuel & 
Petrochemical Mfr. v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 5665232, at *9 
(D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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proportionality review under which smaller benefits may be more 
difficult to justify. 
The dilemma can also be seen as a clash between the 
interests of the state adopting the measure to tackle its minimal 
environmental externalities and the interest of the state of 
production to defend its national status of a domestically optimal 
level of internationalization of externalities. The question is 
whether trade agreements offer legally valid arguments to 
challenge what often is perceived as eco-imperialism. Even if 
there is no explicit limitation on the use of minimal 
environmental interests to defend PPM rules, the argument that 
they are disproportionate and arbitrary is to be expected. 
Especially in close unions such as the EU and the United States, 
solidarity between the states would also offer an argument why 
states perhaps may not adopt PPM rules with minimal 
environmental gain as the measure simultaneously would nullify 
the democratic decision of the producing state to optimally 
internalize the externalities for its people through less strict 
environmental criteria. While this argument would not be equally 
strong in a WTO context, one should keep in mind the political 
reality and the fact that an interpretation of the WTO 
agreements too open to eco-imperialism may estrange developing 
countries from the organization. 
The limits that stem from the extraterritoriality test as 
applied in connection with environmental grounds of justification 
were not the full story. It was explained that both the EU and the 
WTO have included the protection of public morals as a ground of 
justification in their trade law regimes. Some goods and services 
are considered immoral because of how they may harm the 
utilizer at the stage of consumption. Rather than a question of 
utility maximization, the prohibition of these may potentially 
relate to the effect they would have on vulnerable individuals in 
the long-term and thus also on societal burden and stability. In 
other words, the public morals exemption could in this context be 
linked to either utility or welfare maximization. 
Transposing the public morality exemption to the context of 
environmental externalities out-of-state gives a different picture. 
Moral externalities may arise, for example, from knowledge that 
personal consumption contributes to out-of-state pollution and 
results in a higher total pollution. Dealing with these would not 
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serve welfare but may increase local utility. Yet it should be 
reminded that trade law does not welcome measures tackling 
externalities that extreme patriots are burdened buy as a 
consequence of trade with out-of-state actors. Approving other 
purely emotional dimensions could consequently be regarded as 
incoherent. Moreover, a broad reading of public morals may 
shake the foundations of free trade. First, it would open the 
possibility to question almost any PPM rule that is different in 
another state. Secondly, it may be practically difficult to separate 
prohibited patriotic emotions from other emotions. 
While the U.S. regime seems to be hesitant with respect to 
moral justifications and the EU has so far generally not opened 
the door for any other moral justifications than those relating to 
the protection of vulnerable consumers, the WTO appears to be 
moving in direction of accepting a broader range of moral grounds 
for justifying prima facie prohibited measures. On the one hand, 
this could be explained by the fact that the WTO is such a large 
community of states that flexibility with regards to moral 
conceptions must be maintained. On the other hand, the 
possibility to justify concerns about moral externalities related for 
example to the environmental effects of PPMs out-of-state invites 
some eco-imperialism that may be particularly harmful on the 
global arena due to the whole history of imperialism as practiced 
by current western developed states, together with the fact that 
their environmentally harmful actions throughout history has 
laid the foundations for the global economic divide. 
The rejection of the moral argument leaves us with the 
environmental interests. The likely failure to defend minimal 
environmental benefits under either justification or 
proportionality tests would cement the idea of a de minimis 
threshold. In other words, states much present evidence that 
there is a need of protection against cross-border environmental 
effects that exceed a certain threshold. Admittedly, this does bar 
states from dealing with a small degree of actual local 
environmental externalities. 
What is the significance of all of this for the energy 
transition? States should, under all three jurisdictions, have a 
right to defend limitations extending also to the PPMs of 
imported energy at least if the environmental effects will clearly 
be cross-border. This would apply certainly for GHG emissions 
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and in many cases other air pollution. Measures of promoting 
renewable energy at the expense of fossil fuels would in other 
words enjoy strong a strong legal position. In contrast, 
restrictions on activities with primarily local soil or water 
pollution or on local biodiversity would be more difficult to justify. 
Equally, restrictions on imports of energy from nuclear fission 
would also face more hurdles in the argumentation of 
justifiability due to the relative weakness of the moral argument 
and the possibility that accident risks are deemed to fall below a 
de minimis threshold. 
In conclusion, trade law regimes analyzed in this article 
would appear quite favorable for the energy transition toward 
renewables. Extraterritoriality tests may instead set stricter 
limits on state competence to impose PPM rules in other sectors. 
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